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What  I shall  present  will  not be an  analysis,  but an  appraisal.  I
hold  that  economics  is not a  natural  science  in which one  deals with
absolutes  and  has  bases  for  measurement,  but  is  rather  a  subject
dealing with man and his  freedom of action.  Foreign  trade  is such a
field  of human  action,  in which  man  creates,  sets,  and  changes  con-
ditions.  Appraising  prospects  is just  as  much  a  matter  of  complex
judgment  as  is  the  adventure  of  marketing  commodities  in  distant
lands of the world. While certain limitations, rigidities, and elasticities
are involved, the most fascinating aspect is  the leeway for action,  not
its imagined absence.
Under  a  Republican  administration  we  are  tenaciously beset  by
many old, almost forgotten  problems  of agricultural  policy,  as  in the
days of the New Deal. On June  1,  1954,  we had government  holdings
of almost  900  million  bushels  of wheat,  over  900 million  bushels  of
feed  grain,  1.4 billion  pounds of butter,  cheese,  and  dried  milk,  7.3
million bales of cotton, 610 million pounds of tobacco, large quantities
of oilseeds  and vegetable  oils,  and  miscellaneous  other products.  The
new wheat crop will add another 300 million bushels to the carryover.
The contents of the public granaries are truly enormous.  The Congress
increased  the borrowing authority  of the Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion  as  of July  1 this  year  to  8.5  billion  dollars,  and  on  August  18
raised  it  to  a  total  of  10  billion  dollars.  These  publicly  owned  sur-
pluses  clog  available  storage  facilities,  reducing  space  available  for
new  crops,  and  are  a  major  disturbing  factor  in  the  world  market.
Our wheat  stocks  alone  are  almost  as  large  as  the  total  world  trade
in wheat  in  1953.  These  surpluses  are  the backwash  of the overlong
extension of an all-out wartime production policy guaranteeing  a high
price  floor  to  several  million  farmers  irrespective  of  supplies  avail-
able.
The supply situation  is  no  longer  a collection  of facts  and figures
of interest  to  some commodity  merchants  and  brokers.  It  has forced
legislators  in the Congress,  the executive branch of the federal  govern-
ment, and the national  farmer organizations  to work out adjustments,
no  matter how unpleasant,  politically  inexpedient,  or unpalatable  to
some they may be.  All responsible leaders in public affairs now realize
that we  simply  cannot  continue  a policy  which  wastes  economic  re-
sources and diminishes  our welfare, producing  supplies  nobody wants
11and  storing  them  at  public  expense  until,  to be  moved  at all,  they
must  be given  away,  if not destroyed.
Support  prices  have  been  lowered  slightly.  The  Siamese  twin  of
all price supports-restrictive  quotas on production  and marketing-
has  been  reintroduced.  The  cuts  in acreage  for  cotton,  wheat,  and
corn are severe.  Still unsolved  is  the problem of disposing of surpluses
already  accumulated  without  upsetting  the  precariously  supported,
though  not  actually  held,  prices  in  the  markets.  It  is  feared  that
declining  exports  may  cause  a  deluge  of additional  surpluses.  Here
is  where  the  world  market  and  international  trade  enter  into  the
picture. In 1951  the produce of over 50 million United States acres was
exported; in  1953, the produce of 30 million; in 1954, except for cotton,
the  export  volume  has  been  shrinking  further.  In  1952  American
exports  contributed  the  following  percentages  to cash  farm  receipts
for  the  commodities  specified:  dried  whole  milk,  43;  wheat,  corn,
barley,  rice,  grain  sorghums,  rye,  dry  beans  and  peas,  37;  cotton,
30:  and  tobacco,  hops,  lard,  tallow,  plums  and  prunes,  20-28.  In
1951  exports  of  these  commodities  contributed  even  more  to  cash
receipts.
In  the  fifty  years  between  1900  and  1951  the volume  of  United
States exports remained  at or oscillated between 25 percent above and
25 percent  below the 1924-29  average, but during the  1930's dropped
to 50 percent  of it. The volume  shows,  therefore,  a remarkable  resist-
ance against radical shrinkage except in response to a deliberate policy
of withdrawal  from  the  world  market.  The annual  value  of exports
shot  up  from  1  billion  dollars  in  prewar  years  to  almost  4  billion
dollars  after World War  I,  and from  750 million dollars in the 1930's
to 4  billion dollars  after World  War  II.
After  twelve or  thirteen years  of extraordinary  prosperity,  a huge
capital  investment,  and  a  far-reaching  renewal  of  its  technical  and
biological  inventory,  American  agriculture  now  has a  much greater
effective  capacity  to produce  than it had before  World  War  II,  and
it can step up the volume  and shift the emphasis in production  faster
than  ever  before.  Hence,  there  is  a  powerful  incentive  to  maintain
exports at  a high  level.  If prices cannot  be raised  or  tend to decline,
the  volume  that  can  be  sold  governs  the  gross  income.
First let  us  delve  into  the  international  situation  as  the  environ-
ment for foreign trade, and  the leeway for this country,  as the leading
power in the world, actually  to shape this situation  toward expanding
foreign  trade.  Then  I  shall  review  the  changes  in the major  areas of
the  world's  food  economy,  the  prospects  for  American  exports  of
chief  commodity  groups,  and  conclude  by  appraising  the  probable,
12and what  I consider  a  desirable,  course  in agricultural  export  policy
in the next few years.
THE  ENVIRONMENT  FOR  FOREIGN  TRADE
Agricultural exports are a part of the economic  intercourse between
nations.  Dealing  with  some  of  man's  vital  raw  materials,  they  are
dependent  on  the political  and  military world  climate.  The current
"peace"  impresses  me  as  merely  a  continuation  of  war  with  other
weapons,  including  such  insidious  ones  as  vodka  and  caviar  served
in foreign  embassies  in Moscow  or Nanking.  Yet  it also  appears  that
neither  side  has much taste at the moment for firing the first  shot in
World  War  III.  We  may  have  five,  ten,  or  fifteen  more  years  of
tension,  local  conflict,  further  division  of  nations,  more  disarma-
ment  conferences  and  continued  rearmament,  but  no  major  out-
break  of war.
In such a situation,  the importance  of certain gradual adjustments
that have  been  taking  place  in  associations  among  nations  must  be
recognized.  During  the  war  we  were  the  power  that was  defeating
the Nazi  war machine and was salvaging  our nearly  defeated  allies -
even  to the point of supplying the Red army with food, shoes,  trucks,
and ammunition. After the war our allies clung to us for rehabilitation.
But Western  Europe's  economy  is  now  almost  entirely  restored,  not
only  having  made  up  its  losses  but having  gained  some  50  percent
more in industrial production.  Thus, the British Commonwealth closes
ranks and makes itself more independent  of the United States, unwill-
ing to lean as heavily  on us as it had for more than a decade.  Most of
the  countries  on  the  Continent,  willingly  or  unwillingly,  follow  suit.
This  has advantages  for  the free  world;  all nations  need  to stand  on
their  own  feet  economically  and  also  need  a  healthy  expansion  of
world trade.  This  is particularly  true of the countries  of Europe.
The United States has decreased  its tariff rates to the lowest  point
in its long protectionist  history, has participated  in the GATT  agree-
ments,  and  has poured  30  billion dollars  into  European  and  Asiatic
reconstruction.  But  as  a nation  we  are  not  ready  to  assume  the role
England  once  played  as the  banking  and  trade  center  of the world,
or  to facilitate world  trade  and  the transfer  of capital as  a necessary
venture.  We have withdrawn  gold from circulation as a trade medium
and use it instead  as  a dead  security.  Although  we long ago outgrew
our status as  a nation of infant industries,  we still maintain  a protec-
tionist  policy  for  agriculture  and  many  now  extremely  powerful
industries,  such  as  our  vast  array  of  chemical  plants.  For  reasons
having  chiefly  to  do  with  national  defense,  we  give  aid  to  other
nations,  often  overgenerously.  But  when  it  comes  to  aiding  trade,
our  national  action  is  still  hesitant  and  parsimonious.
13In  1953  the Bank  of England  and Western  Germany  were  ready
to make the pound sterling  and the Deutsche  mark freely convertible.
Had  they  succeeded,  many  other  countries  could  not  have  helped
following  suit.  But  the  Bank  of England  wanted  assurance  that,  in
the event of cornering  attacks  on the pound  sterling by  international
speculators,  the  United  States  Treasury  would join  forces  with  the
Bank  in its defense.  This proposal  was  rejected,  and a unique oppor-
tunity to expand world  trade  and prosperity for the West was lost.
To understand why the return to convertibility  is crucial,  we must
remember  that  the  world-wide  autarchy drive and exalted economic
nationalism  which  stymied  economic  development  began  with  the
introduction of foreign  exchange  controls during the great depression
of the early  1930's.  Import quotas,  licenses,  and embargoes  are only
supplementary  fences  erected  around  a  market  to  make  foreign-
exchange  controls  effective.  Once  the  price-the  exchange  value-
of a currency  is artificially  fixed  and  pegged,  planned  economy  is  its
only defense.  False exchange rates make  prices  meaningless and com-
petition  a game with loaded  dice.  If currencies  were convertible  and
controls and quotas abolished,  trade would quickly  assume the multi-
angular  pattern  of the  days  before  World  War  I.  The  problem  of
dollar  balances  and  bilateral  arrangements  would  disappear,  and
merchants  would  buy  where  they  could  get  the  desired  quality  of
product  at the  most  advantageous  price  and  mode  of payment.
Foreign countries must  eventually  be able  to earn dollars  enough
in  the aggregate  if they are  to  buy more  American  goods.  This they
cannot  do  unless we  export  dollars  in the  form  of a stronger  flow of
American  investment  abroad,  or  buy  more  goods  abroad.  For  prac-
tical success,  both are necessary. Foreigners desiring to sell in the United
States are faced  with other obstacles besides  import duties and deter-
rent customs procedures.  The sheer size of the American market poses
grave  problems  in  advertising  and  merchandising.
Only  four  years  ago,  with  the  outbreak  of  the  Korean  war,  a
general  scare  about  food  shortages  sent  the  prices  of  agricultural
commodities  skyrocketing.  But  today  reports  from  all  parts  of  the
world  indicate  a return  of food  and  fiber production  and  per capita
supply  to normal  rates  prevailing  before  World  War  II.  Farm  pro-
duction for the world as a whole has caught up with the large increase
of a population  now estimated at 2.5 billion people.  For grain, sugar,
fats and  oils, and even for animal products, there is no longer a seller's
market;  available  supplies,  with a few  exceptions  such as  coffee,  tea,
and some  spices,  exceed  the immediately  effective demand. There is a
stand-by  capacity  to  produce  that  adds to  the atmosphere  of plenty
'United Nations,  World Economic Report,  1952-53, New  York,  1954.
14and of softening  prices.  It  is against  this background that we  have  to
weigh  our agricultural  export  policy.
The most effective support for a strong and steady flow of United
States  agricultural  exports  which our  government  can  provide  is  to
give  active  and  effective  assistance  to  foreign  note-issuing  banks  in
their efforts  to  restore convertibility  of currencies.  Any  improvement
in  customs  procedures,  abatement  of  import  duties,  or  increase  in
private  foreign  investment  also  would  aid  agricultural  exports.
Yet in  the emergency created  by the  overflowing granaries,  there
are  some  moral  obligations  to be  noted,  which  are  also  matters  of
practical  common  sense.  Our  tariff  policy  has  always  been dictated
by  a  philosophy  that  defines  dumping  as  an  unfair  trade  practice.
Dumping simply means  selling a commodity  abroad at a lower price
than at home.  Our customs service guards against dumping by foreign
manufacturers,  frequently  checks  the  facts  in the  countries of origin,
and  applies  countervailing  duties  or  refuses  the  imports  entry  into
this country. When we are on the receiving end, we bitterly denounce
the practice  as cut-throat  competition  or  worse.  But we  cannot  very
well just ignore this when we ourselves  are eager to export agricultural
or other products.  Moreover,  we cannot start dumping stocks without
reaping  the practical  consequences  of deep resentment and retaliation
with  the  whole  arsenal  of protectionsim  and  economic  nationalism.
Exporting  with  government  subsidies  is  the  worst  sort of  dumping.
That  some  other  nations,  such  as  France,  are  preparing  to engage
in this  practice  does  not  make  it  any better.
If the domestic price  is fixed  by government  action, and that price
is  higher  than  the  world  market  level,  practically  nothing  can  be
exported  unless it  is dumped.  The "need"  to dump,  therefore,  arises
from  a  policy  of supporting  domestic  prices  which,  in  the  event  of
oversupply,  constitutes  price-fixing.  If we  were  to  choose  a different
method  of  supporting  farm  income--one  which  would  not  tamper
with the market price-we would not find ourselves  in  this dilemma.
This  is  why  nearly  all  agricultural  economists  of  repute  advocate
making compensatory  or deficiency payments to farmers, which leaves
intact the  price  mechanism  and  the market.
The  course  of  our  farm  income-support  policy,  the  principal
philosophy and devices  of which have remained  the same since  1933,
is  in contradiction  with a foreign-trade  policy giving  our farmers  the
benefit  of a healthy  flow of exports.  The report  of the Randall Com-
mission on Foreign Economic  Policy states, "It  is necessary to harmo-
nize our agricultural  and foreign economic  policies without sacrificing
15the  sound  objectives  of either."  President  Eisenhower's  comment  on
this  was,  "I  am  convinced  such  reconciliation  is possible." 2
CHANGES  IN  THE  WORLD  FOOD  ECONOMY
But even if everything were  ideally arranged  for a maximum flow
of  exports,  might  not  prospective  foreign  purchasers  have  enough
from  their  own  production  to  satisfy  their  needs?  A  brief glance  at
the major  areas of the world  shows  the following  picture.  Europe,  as
the  traditional  main  purchaser  of  American  products,  has  gone
through  a rapid  and successful  process  of agricultural  reconstruction
accelerated  by  energetic  American  army,  ECA,  and  MSA  aid  to
industrial  reconstruction.  Restoration  of  European  consumer  pur-
chasing power has kept farm prices  remunerative  and  has stimulated
recovery.  Public planning  and financing  have played  a part in mech-
anization  and  in  supplying  fertilizer,  seed,  and  pesticides.  The  em-
phasis  has been  on  increasing  the acreage  of high-yielding  crops and
boosting  the  yields  of all  crops.
The  United  Kingdom  subsidizes  agriculture  to  create  larger
domestic  supplies  for  emergencies  and  to  decrease  dependence  on
overseas  markets.  Instead  of  importing  75  percent  of its  food  as  it
did in prewar years, it now imports only 50 to 60 percent. Agricultural
output  is high.  After fourteen  and a half years,  rationing of food and
feed  has finally been  abolished, but markets of farm products remain
controlled  by  boards.  British  farmers  since  the  end  of the  war  have
increased  the proportion  of their land  used for fodder and decreased
the  crop  area,  and  grow  one-third  less  wheat.  The  emphasis  is  on
livestock  production,  but  chiefly  on  the  basis  of  domestic  fodder.
Livestock produced  with home-grown feed  in 1954 is over  50  percent
greater  than in prewar  years.
Yet  the  United  Kingdom  is  still  the  world's  greatest  market  for
agricultural  exports,  food  as  well  as  feed  and  fibers.  In  1952  agri-
cultural imports  were 7.6  billion dollars,  or 50 percent of the imports
of fourteen OEEC countries. 3The imports in  1951 and 1952 amounted
roughly to  6-7 million tons of grain, over  1 million tons of oilcake and
meal,  1.4 million  tons  of fats  and  oils,  and  1.2  million  tons  of meat.
But, naturally,  the British make the most of their purchases and place
them where  they do the most good for their industrial exports,  partic-
ularly  in sterling-bloc  and  other  soft-currency  countries.  It  is British
policy  to  become  as independent  as  possible  of American  economic
283rd  Congress,  2nd  Session,  House  Document 360  (Message  of  the  President  to  the
Congress).
3Cf.  OEEC, General Statistics, No. 3, 1954,  Paris,  May  1954.
16affairs and the possibility of an American depression or the recurrence
of high  American  protection.
One  of the  results  of the  recovery  of agricultural  production  in
Europe is that Germany, the second largest  export market  in Europe,
is  trying  to buy  as much wheat  as  she  can from France  and Turkey.
She even bought some  10 million bushels from Sweden.  Italy imports
over  1 million  tons of grain  net,  and some  200,000  tons  of fats,  and
thus ranks with Belgium  and  the Netherlands.
In general, all of Western Europe, except Spain, plus French North
Africa,  had  good  grain  crops  last  year  and  favorable  prospects  for
this year.  Besides expanded output of grain,  there is a large output of
potatoes  (the  equivalent  of corn  in the  United  States),  and  an even
larger output of sugar beets. Measured  by prewar records, the produc-
tion  of all  types  of meat  is  high, but still far below what the demand
could  be if consumer purchasing  power were  to increase  or the price
of meat to fall.  Europe's dairy industry  output  is expanding,  and  the
supply  of butter  and  cheese  is  increasing.
As production mounts and the last remnants  of wartime  food and
feed  rationing  disappear  with  the  restoration  of  the  food  economy
to  a  more  normal  state  and  better-stocked  pantry  shelves,  the  old
tendency to protect agriculture against overseas competition is coming
to the fore again.  Attempts to establish  a green pool  or a government
cartel  of  agricultural  producers  in  the  six  Schuman  Plan  countries
are  now  virtually dead.  While  they  aimed  at  the  abolition  of trade
barriers  for selected  agricultural  commodities  within  the  pool  coun-
tries, they also involved the possibility of a common customs boundary
against  overseas  countries.  The  reason  these  efforts  foundered  lies
primarily in the diversity of interest among  the six partner  countries.
The Germans must boost their industrial exports  or face  domestic
chaos and foreign domination.  Radical agricultural protection within
their  free-market  economy  is,  therefore,  impossible,  but the situation
militates  for  bilateral  trade  agreements.  While  cereal  consumption
is  shrinking,  the  tendency  to  increase  the  consumption  of  animal
products  and vegetable  fats  prevails.  In  1952-53  the  per capita  con-
sumption  of meat  was  still  20  percent  below  prewar.  The  Germans
buy agricultural  products  in countries  which are willing  to buy more
German  industrial  export  goods.  I  expect  them  to  maintain  heavy
agricultural  imports  despite  rising  agricultural  production.
The  French,  with  their  heavily  planned  economy  and  state
ownership  of basic  industries,  are  facing  in agriculture  surplus  prob-
lems  similar  to  those  confronting  the  United  States.  The  French
think more  in  terms  of state-controlled  agricultural  markets,  public
17granaries,  and  subsidized  farm  exports.  Danish  agriculture  has  be-
come  more  self-sufficient  in  feedstuffs,  but has large  exportable  sup-
plies  of  butter,  bacon,  and  eggs.
Taking  Continental Western Europe  (the  NATO countries  minus
Britain  plus  Western  Germany)  as  an  area,  I  would  expect  in  the
coming  years  an  increasing  output  in  animal  products,  vegetables,
and  fruits,  and  also  in  bread  grain,  potatoes,  sugar  beets,  and  feed
materials.  The  deficit  to  be  imported  from  overseas  will  consist
chiefly  of some  quality  wheat,  feed  grains,  and  oilseeds-the  latter
for  crushing  vegetable  oil  and  having  available  high-protein  feed
concentrates.  The  purchases  of  these  materials,  so  long  as  currency
convertibility  is  not  generally  achieved,  will  be  negotiated  mainly
against  concessions  on  industrial  imports  by  the  export  countries.
But for many commodities,  price, conditions  of payment, and  quality
will determine where they are bought. With stocks already replenished,
there  seems  little  intention  to  lay  in  larger ones.
Next  to  Western  Europe,  the  entire  Soviet  orbit  is  a  potential
exporter  as well  as  a  buyer  of agricultural  products.  The  USSR,  its
western satellites,  China,  North Korea,  and  North Indo-China  com-
pose the area. None other presents  so  many puzzles.  It  is  a  vast  area
of the globe  and a large  segment of the human race, where  industrial-
ization  is forced  by rugged  state capitalism  and  agriculture  is  collec-
tivized.  The  expansion  of  agricultural  production  is  demonstrably
and  admittedly  the  weakest  link  in  the  system.  Large  agricultural
exports  are,  therefore,  improbable.  While  enough  cereals  and  sugar
for  direct  human  consumption  are  being  grown,  the  supply  of  all
animal  products  and  fats  remains critically  short.  The  reason  is  that
animal  production  is  located  in  the  native  forest  belts  and  requires
mixed  farming,  a  system  which  does  not  easily  lend  itself  to  MTS
operation  or  collective  management.
Will  the  USSR  and  the  western  satellites import  feed  materials,
or  instead  buy animal products and  fats?  It  is  my  guess  that if there
is  no  major war and  the  Soviets grant  the Russian  consumer  a little
more leeway in his diet, the USSR will probably buy animal products
and  fats  in  the  world  market  rather  than  feed  grain.  In  fact,  the
pressure  on  butter  prices  in  the  world  market  has  recently  been
lessened  by  Soviet  purchases.  Measured  by  the  exorbitant  prices  of
animal  products  inside  Russia,  the world-market  offers  are  cheap.  I
also conclude,  for  different  reasons,  that Soviet  China,  too,  will buy
animal  products  rather  than  feed  grain  in  the  world  market.  She
may,  in  addition,  buy wheat  and  rice.
A  rider  must  be  attached  to  this  speculation,  however.  If  the
Soviets should  conclude trade  treaties with Western Europe and other
18countries which open their market for industrial goods,  they may buy
animal  products  from  Europe  or  South  America  rather  than  from
North America, Africa, or Oceania.  This would also suit their political
intentions.  In  that  case  the  Europeans  would  become  even  greater
buyers  of feed  materials-grains  and  feed  proteins.  New  possibilities
would  then  emerge  for  American  exports of corn,  sorghums,  barley,
and  soybeans.
The  free  Asian  countries,  including  Japan,  South  Korea,  the
Philippine  Republic,  India,  Pakistan,  Burma,  South  Indo-China,
Thailand,  and  Indonesia  make  up  an  area  with  vast  numbers  of
consumers.  Industrial Japan,  with  close  to  90  million  people,  is  cut
off  from  trade  with  China  and  Manchuria  and  cannot  obtain  her
former  imports of food from Korea.  Today Japan  is one of the prom-
inent importers  of food,  buying 20  percent abroad.  In  1952  food and
other  agricultural  imports  amounted  to  1.5  billion  dollars,  and
included  1.7  million  metric  tons  of wheat,  1 million  metric  tons  of
rice,  nearly  1 million metric  tons of barley, and 700,000  tons of sugar.
With  a  growing  population  and  a  great dearth  of natural  resources,
Japan  almost inevitably  will  continue  to  buy  substantial  amounts  of
cereals,  sugar,  fats,  and  even  animal products  abroad.
In India and Pakistan  it will be chiefly a question of buying large
quantities  of cereals  when  the  monsoon  rain  fails  to  come  in  time,
as in  1952,  when  these  countries  had  net imports  of 2.8  million  tons
of wheat.  But  better  storage  facilities  and  intensification  of farming
may  diminish  import  needs  even  in  bad  years.  Concentration  of
policies on boosting agricultural output of food and fiber  for domestic
consumption,  and  of  agricultural  export  commodities  such  as jute,
tea,  rubber, and spices,  will  show results in larger crop  acreages and
yields. Thus,  the demand for imports will depend  chiefly  on compen-
sation  for  poor  crops  owing  to  bad  weather,  or  pests,  or  on  great
success  in  earning  funds  with agricultural  and  industrial  exports.
Central  and  South  Africa  and  the  Near  East  can  more  or  less
be  ignored  as markets.  The Near  East exports considerable  amounts
of wheat from Turkey and Africa, peanuts, and miscellaneous products.
Latin  America  has  a  rapidly  rising  white  population.  Intensive
industrialization drives are under way in Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina,
and elsewhere,  and  there  is a  lag in the development  of agricultural
resources.  Measured  by  the  value  of the world's  agricultural  foreign
trade, Latin-American agricultural imports are not of first magnitude.
In  1952  the  value  of  all  Central  and  South  American  agricultural
imports was  less  than  700  million dollars.  Yet  this  was  close  to  half
the  imports  of all  free  Asian countries,  or more  than  the  imports of
Africa  and  Oceania  combined.  Latin  America  may  loom  large,
19however,  as a  buyer  of some  of our  agricultural  exports.  Cuba  and
Brazil have  become  the  most important buyers.  With their  emphasis
on  exportable  plantation  commodities  with  a  preferred  place in  the
American  market  (coffee,  cane  sugar),  their  markets  deserve  the
particular  attention  of American  exporters.
There  will  be a  steady demand  for  250  million dollars'  worth  of
American  farm  products  in  Canada,  so  long  as  the  Canadians  can
export  other farm  products  to us.  We  sell  cotton,  citrus  fruit,  vege-
tables,  and  feed  concentrates  to  them,  while  they  sell  grain,  meat,
apples,  etc.,  to us. The more Canada  and the  United States accumu-
late commodity stocks,  the more importing countries will avoid buying
more  than normal  pipeline  supplies.
In  drawing  together  the  area  survey,  I  would  put  the  major
markets  in  this order.  Within  the coming  decade,  the  chief concen-
tration  of effective  purchasing  power  outside  the  United  States  will
lie  in  parts  of Western  Europe  (the  United  Kingdom  and  the most
industrialized  parts of the  Continent)  and in  Canada.  Even with the
success expected in agricultural  intensification  in this area,  the deficit
in  grains,  oilseeds,  tobacco,  and  cotton  may  expand  rather  than
shrink.  If  the  USSR  and  her  western  satellites  should  engage  in  a
large  volume  of  trade  with  the  West,  this  European  deficit  might
increase,  because  Continental  farmers  would  want  to  process  feed
materials  into  exportable  animal  products.  Free  Asia  would  rank
next,  with  Japan  and  India  as major  buyers.  Latin  America  would
be  a  promising  third,  if  not  eventually  a  second,  market  area.
PROSPECTS  FOR  AMERICAN  EXPORTS
But  international  trade  is  a  matter  of exchanging  specific  quan-
tities  of  specific  commodities  of  specific  qualities  within  the  general
framework  of exchange  of goods,  services,  and  gold.  The  chances for
the American  farmer to export each year several billion dollars' worth
of major  farm products  appear  to  me  as  follows.
Prospects  for  selling  a  large  volume  of  American  cotton  and
tobacco  abroad  seem  better  than  for  many  other  products.  Our
capacity  to produce  cotton at high wages with low costs per unit and
to  ship  it  in  good  standard  quality  in  reliable  volume  at  any  time
are  still  the  best  in the  world.  Cotton  lint has  a great  unchallenged
future  as  a  fiber;  the same  is  true  for cottonseed  as an  oil  and feed-
protein source.  The accelerated  development  and industrialization  of
colonial  countries  means,  first of all,  the rise  of light industries,  and
first  among  them  cotton  mills.  By  virtue  of  the  combined  require-
ments  of  soil  and  climate,  capital  for  production,  gins,  and  trans-
portation,  there  will be  less  competition  with  other  export  countries
20than in  the case  of grains.  If high employment  is  maintained  in the
United States and Western Europe, the foreign demand for American
cotton will be  high, provided  its price  is competitive;  if so offered,  a
large volume will be bought.4 This will also hold for tobacco, although
here  it  is  primarily  a  matter  of importing-country  tax  policies.
The  future  of wool,  still  a  fiber  without  equal-synthetic  fibers
notwithstanding-seems  also  bright.  But under  our  economic  condi-
tions,  sheep husbandry  must adjust  to high-quality  meat production,
with  coarse wool  as a  by-product.  Most  of our apparel  wool  will  be
imported  from  Australia, New Zealand,  Uruguay,  and  Argentina  at
prices  lower  than  ours.
Other industrial raw materials produced in agriculture  are linseed
and  tallow-one  for  oil  paint and  coatings,  the  other for  soap.  Lin-
seed production  competes in the West with wheat and  barley for the
same  land  and  equipment.  As  both  crops  face  severe  acreage  cuts
(wheat now, barley later), linseed  may gain and find foreign markets
as seed or oil - as, for example, in Germany - if the price is competitive
with  synthetic  resins  and  the  industrial  boom  continues  over  there.
Tallow  is  a  by-product  of  beef,  and  will  continue  to  find  foreign
markets  insofar  as it cannot  be  absorbed  at  home.  To  utilize  more
domestically  would  require  the  import  of more  coconut  oil  without
the  3 cent excise  tax; only with coconut oil can tallow be transformed
into  good soap  and defend  its  position against  the detergents.
The  picture  becomes  more  clouded  the moment  we  look  at  the
grain  markets.  The  OEEC  reports  for  fourteen  European  countries
in 1953-54  a total production of 45 million metric  tons of bread grain
(wheat plus  rye)  against  34 million  prewar,  and a  total  coarse-grain
crop of 39 million metric tons as against 30 million prewar. Also, there
are 2.5 million metric tons of grain equivalent in the form of potatoes
in excess  of the prewar supply.  Except for the possibility of years with
bad weather, we may expect Europe's grain crops to rise in the future.
World wheat  and wheat-flour  exports  this  year are  probably still  80
percent  above prewar,  but the share of the major exporting  countries
is undergoing radical change.  In prewar years Canada was the great-
est exporter,  Argentina next,  Australia  third, various other  countries
fourth, and  the  United  States,  with  8  percent  of world exports,  last.
During  the  war and  until  1949  we  were in  first  place,  far  ahead  of
Canada,  which  was  second;  Australia  was  third,  Argentina  fourth,
and  various  other  countries  fifth.  Last  year  Canada  had  regained
first  position,  the  United  States  was  second,  Australia  still  third,
4 Cf.  remarks  of  Lamar  Fleming,  Jr.,  Chairman  of the  Board, Anderson,  Clayton,
and  Company,  at the  American  Cotton  Congress,  Corpus  Christi,  Texas, June  4,  1954.
21various  other  countries  fourth,  and  Argentina  last.  Argentina,  how-
ever,  is  expanding acreage  and  in time may move  up to fourth posi-
tion. What position the United States will occupy depends on whether
we want to  ship  wheat at  lower  prices  or  give  up competing,  as  we
did in prewar  years.
In  the  tough  competition  to  come  among  exporters,  the  Inter-
national  Wheat  Agreement  of  1953,  which  covers  only  one-half  of
world exports, will not be of much assistance. The importing countries
will not  have  much  incentive  to  build larger  stocks.  In fact,  I  even
expect  other  exporting  countries  to  leave  the job  of  holding  stocks
mostly  to  us.  In  general,  I  do  not  look  for  any real  aid  to  farmers
through international  commodity cartel  deals;  they are  all restrictive
and  defend  the  status quo.  If we  want  to retain  a  large  share  in  the
world wheat market, we must export at prices that offer the maximum
incentive  to  expand  the  food  and  feed  use of wheat.  Europe's  share
in imports  may decline  below its present  50 percent  of world exports
(compared  with  75  percent  before  the war),  while  Asia's  share may
rise  considerably  above  the  25  percent  it  now  has  (compared  with
10 percent prewar).
As  the  country  with  the  highest  farm  wages,  the  United  States
nevertheless  is  producing  rice, a  grain  typical  for  countries with the
lowest  farm  wages,  very  efficiently,  and  may continue  to  export  to
Japan and  Korea,  and  may perhaps  sell  even to China.
The chances for selling feed  grain in general seem brighter.  Corn,
barley,  sorghums, and oats should have  good foreign markets,  partic-
ularly in Europe.  But  a steady permanent  flow  of United  States feed
grains  to Europe requires prices that give animal feeders a strong edge,
especially  if  East-West  trade  should  come  to  full  swing,  as  seems
likely.  Relatively  low feed  grain prices  would, in due time,  bring the
prices of meat and eggs down, and thereby progressively expand their
demand.
In the  area of fats  and oils our chances also  seem fair. The  Euro-
peans  cannot  afford  to  produce  annual  oil  crops  on  a  large  scale.
These  require  too much  precious  land  and  too  much sunshine,  and
yields are  low.  Europe's  best fat  producers  are  dairy cows,  and  even
they need  oilcake  and meal.  Mediterranean  olive  oil  production  is  a
different  matter. The main  bulk  of fats for the  United  Kingdom  and
the  industrial  countries  on  the  Continent  must  come  as  whale  oil,
tropical  palm  fats,  or  annual  oilseeds.  The whale oil supply is  fixed
by  the  International  Whaling  Agreement.  Palm  fats  yield  little,  if
any,  cake.
Since feed  porteins are scarce  on the  Continent,  and Manchurian
22soybeans now go to Russia, American soybean production has a good
chance  of supplying  part of the need.  Soybeans are a crop well  suited
to  the  land-use  pattern  of  the  corn  belt,  and  their  position  should
improve  as  the  coarse-grain  acreage  is  reduced.  The  chief  market
for soybeans  is  in  Europe  (Germany,  France,  Holland,  and  Scandi-
navia),  but Japan,  Formosa,  and  Canada  are  also large buyers.  The
American  soybean  export  industry  must  guard  the  quality  of  its
product.  At  the  European  oilseed  crushers'  association  meeting  in
Cannes,  the complaint about  4 to  6  percent impurities  in American-
grown  soybeans  was  general.  Sunflower  and  safflower may  possibly
be grown, eventually,  on a large scale  in the United States for export
purposes.  Both  fit  into  western  grain  farming;  both  can  substitute
as  crops  for wheat or  barley.
With  a  highly  efficient  production  of  feed  grain,  oilcake,  and
succulent  feed,  and  an  equally  efficient  production  of  milk,  eggs,
chicken meat, and pork there is no reason why these American animal
products  cannot  be  sold  at  competitive  prices  in  the  world  market.
It  is a question for efficient agricultural  producers  to decide.  In grain
and  bulk  products,  salesmanship  has little  leverage,  while  price  and
quality  exert  a  great  deal.  But  it  is  a  different  story  with  finished
products.  There  packaged  goods  are sold  at retail,  and  we  must  see
to it that the quality is peerless and the price to the ultimate consumer
is  as reasonable  and  attractive  as possible.
Of all  the animal  proteins  we  produce,  dried  skim milk is  by far
the most price-worthy,  the  most nutritionally valuable,  and the most
versatile  product in kitchen use.  Not milk prices kept high by govern-
ment price  floors,  but  lowered  production  costs  and  improved  serv-
icing  of consumers  at  home  and  in many foreign  lands will  promise
the greatest future for American dairymen. The answer to margarine
is  92 score  butter,  offered  at as tempting  a price  as competition  will
allow.  American  pork  in  small  cans  would  supply  luxury  meat  to
people  in  densely  populated  countries  where  there  is  a  shortage  of
animal  production.  This  means  the  former  colonial  areas  and  the
entire  Soviet orbit.
Many  countries,  particularly  tropical  ones,  can  produce  a  great
variety  of  fruits  and  vegetables.  Theoretically,  any  country  in  any
climate  with  a  large  farm  labor  supply  can  do  so.  But  in  practice,
when it comes to a reliable flow of standard quality that can be shipped
at any time, or when it is a question of dehydrated,  canned,  or deep-
frozen  products,  the  capital  equipment  of American  large-scale  pro-
duction,  processing,  and  shipping is  almost without  competition.  We
cannot  supply mass markets in bulk where  purchasing  power  is  low.
But  we  can  supply  people  in  metropolitan  areas  who  have  a  high
23enough  purchasing  power  to  enjoy fruits or vegetables  out of season.
Again,  it  is  a  question  of  competent  and  aggressive  merchandising
abroad.  If this course  is to  be  taken,  we would need  to  adopt a more
liberal  import  policy  for  foreign  fruits  and  vegetables,  particularly
with our Canadian  and Latin-American  neighbors  and in the Pacific
area.
AGRICULTURAL  EXPORT  POLICY
This  leads  me  back  to  my  starting  point-the  surplus  situation.
With  due regard  to  what  I  have  said about  the foreign  market,  it  is
still axiomatic that the chief solution  of our excess production problem
must  be  sought  at home.  The  American  farmer's  greatest  possession
is  his  vast,  uniform  domestic  market  with  nearly  160  million  con-
sumers,  a  rapidly  rising  population  with  a  mounting  purchasing
power  in  an expanding  economy.  This  market  has such  a  high  pur-
chasing  power  that it  offers ever  greater  opportunities  for  improving
the diet.  We  have  by no  means reached  the  saturation  point  for  per
capita consumption  of animal products-neither  for eggs,  milk, dairy
products  nor  for  red  or white  meat.  Producing  these  would  reduce
the bulk of grain or oilcake  at a ratio of from 13:1 to 6:1,  or an average
of  10:1.  If we  figure  the  truly ingested  portion,  the ratio  is closer  to
15:1.  In other  words,  we  would  reduce  the volume  of  surplus  cereal
supplies  to  one-fifteenth  their weight  in  animal  products.
The  farmer's  gross  income  does  not  depend  on  price  alone,  but
on price times sales volume.  His net income depends on the differential
between  prices  and costs  and  on  his  efficiency  as  a producer.  To  fix
prices  high  and  to  freeze  production  and  marketing  through  quotas
is  the  antithesis  of a flexible  free-enterprise  economy,  and  will never
yield  a good  income.  One  hundred  and  sixty million  consumers  who
have  a  price  incentive  to  buy  exert  a  far  greater  leverage  for  farm
prosperity  than  10,000  quota-enforcing  officers  can  ever  bring  to
bear by the imposition  of restrictions  which, in  effect,  antagonize  and
tax the consumer.
The gap between the present maladjusted  production  and supply
situation and  one  in  which  supplies  flow freely  into consumption  at
home  and  abroad  must  be  closed  primarily  here  at  home.  Quota
restrictions,  unfortunately,  have  become  a  necessary  evil  to  achieve
the  transition.  But the  real adjustment must  be the gradual  lowering
of price  floors while  acreages  are being adjusted and surpluses moved
into consumption  channels.  The whole concept  of a "surplus"  stands
and  falls  with  price-fixing,  just  as  price-fixing  and  rationing  create
the  black  market.  If prices  are free  to move,  they  clear  the  market.
Only  locally  and  very  temporarily  can  quantities  of  agricultural
24products remain unsold  in a truly free  market,  and  then only highly
perishable  ones,  such  as fruits and vegetables.  If anyone  doubts this,
he  may  be  referred  to  the  butcher  store,  where  he  will  learn  how
price  clears  the  shelves  even  of such  perishable  and optional  food  as
meat.  We  hear  a  great  deal  of  loose  political  nonsense  these  days
about how prices do not allocate resources  in agriculture.  The  adjust-
ment  of  acreage  after  potato  price  supports  were  abolished  tells  a
much different  story.
We can keep export markets open for a sizable volume of products
only  by shifting  to  flexible  farm  prices  which  stay  in line  with  com-
petitive  world-market  prices.  But  in  order  to  reach  that  state  of
affairs,  we  must  find  ways  and  means  of reducing  our public  com-
modity  holdings  to  a  normal  size.  This  applies  first  of  all  to  the
enormous  holdings  of  wheat  and  corn.  I  see  a  possibility  of  doing
that  without  creating  havoc  and  heavy  retaliation  in  the  world
market  only  through  four  sorts  of measures:
1.  The main bulk of the excess  must be  used  as  feed  for  livestock
at home. This requires writing off a substantial  loss, but it would give
the  dairymen,  the  cattle  feeders,  the  hog  farmers,  and  the egg-and-
broiler  producers  a  chance  for  profitable  expansion  of  production.
Only  if our  wheat  carryover  can  be  reduced  to  or  below  the  500-
million-bushel  line  will  we  regain  the  necessary  freedom  of  action
with  reference  to  our  storage  facilities.  By  far  the  cheapest  adjust-
ment  of excess  grain  storage  is  via  the  livestock  industry.
2.  A  substantial  part  of  the excess  stocks  should  be  sold  as  feed
material  to  foreign  countries,  if need  be after  denaturing  it, with  the
provision  of a  one-year  credit  by  the  American  exporter.
3.  If we want to put emphasis on maintaining  high production and
farm  income,  rather  than  on  curtailing  production  and  income,
without  disorganizing  the entire  world  market,  we  may use  some  of
the  surpluses  as  a  foreign  investment.  Special  concessions  could  be
granted  to  industrial  enterprises  in  colonial  areas  in  the  form  of
loans of surplus food  for their workers and workers'  families.  It  would
amount  to  a  form  of foreign  aid. Repayment  could  be made later, if
need  be  in  the form of raw materials.  The  trouble  with  this method
is  the red  tape  involved.
4.  I  believe  we  should  also  explore  the  possibility of  laying in  a
military  reserve of wheat  (perhaps as cracked  wheat)  and wheat flour
in  permanent  storage  in  strategically  located  deposits  in  various
defense  areas of the world.  It is possible to store any grain in paper-
sealed  concrete-floor  trench silos for  many years  in perfect condition,
25as storage practice in Argentina,  Uruguay,  and Paraguay  has shown.
I  would  expect  this  true  military  stockpile  laid  in  at the  foreign  air
bases to achieve two purposes:  (a) it  would effectively  and completely
eliminate  this volume from the market in this country and elsewhere;
and  (b)  it would  give  assurance  that for  a period  of five  or six years
emergency  supplies  would  be  available  in  case  of war  at  the  spots
where  needed,  and  thus  would  relieve  our  warehouses,  railroads,
ports, and ships of that much cargo. At the end of five years the stock-
pile  might be  replaced  by new  supplies and  the old  ones released for
whatever  price  they would bring.  If this idea were found  practicable
and were adopted,  it might well be applied  also to the storage of some
canned meat reserves.  However,  this military stockpile offers merely a
limited  supplementary  solution  to  the problem of surplus disposal.
I  do  not  believe  that  either  the  freezing  of  2.5  billion  dollars'
worth of surpluses  nor the sale  of surpluses  for foreign soft  currencies
is a  genuine  solution  to  our  surplus  problem.  The  freezing  does not
eliminate  the  stocks  from  "visible  supply."  The  frozen  quantity  still
continues  to  press  on  the  domestic  and  international  markets.  Sale
for  soft  currency,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  cumbersome,  makeshift
arrangement  that  actually  amounts  to  extending  foreign  aid  via
tortuous  detours.  We  could  much  more  easily  accomplish  that  end
with  earmarked  dollar  aid  to  recipient  countries.  At  best  it  is  a
politically  expedient  method  of extending  aid or  credit.
In closing,  I would like to emphasize again  the fact that tomorrow's
export  market  for any one  commodity  is  not a given  entity  that  can
be measured.  Its  size means the capacity  to absorb  a flow of goods  in
exchange  which  nations  and  their  enterprising  merchants  create  by
intelligent,  resourceful,  and  responsible  action.  Foreign  trade  is  a
two-way  traffic.  We have a good chance  of maintaining  a  prosperous
flow of American  farm exports  if prices are free and competitive.  The
means  for  achieving  it  lie  in  a  progressive  foreign  economic  policy,
in trade negotiations,  in merchandising, and services to our customers.
It  is no  exaggeration  to say that creative imagination  brings potential
demand  to the point of actual  buying.  It  expands  the world market.
To me  it borders on  the  absurd,  therefore,  to approach  the question
of how much farm products we can export by calculating  the "elasti-
city"  of  foreign  demand  by  mathematical  formulas  and  highly
sophisticated  tools  of statistical  analysis.  It  seems just as  absurd  as  a
general's  basing  his  conduct  of a war  on  a statistical  analysis  of  the
enemy's  propensity  to lose.  Fortunately  enough, man  is not a passive
part in a dynamic  process called  history;  instead, he  is endowed with
the responsibility  and the freedom  to chart the  course of history,  and
that includes the agricultural exports  of the United States of America.
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